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THE MODEL HEALTH CARE
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INFORMATION
ACT: MANAGED CARE AND MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY UNDER AN
AMENDED ERISA
INTRODUCTION
Managed care is "[a] health care program designed to make sure
that [plan beneficiaries] receive the highest quality medical care for
the lowest cost, in the most appropriate setting."' This flattering
portrait of managed care-furnished by a managed care
organization-runs counter to what many health care providers and
consumers in general have concluded about this method of health
care delivery.2 While representatives of managed care organizations
1. CIGNA HEALTHCARE HANDBOOK 21 (1997).
2. Dr. Harvey F. Wachsman wrote, "[Managed care executives] and their companies
institute policies that deny patients care and place lives at risk." Harvey F. Wachsman, M.D.,
Letter, Reforms Must Target HMOs and Their CEOs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1997, at A19. For
further discussion of the tension between containing health care costs and providing high-
quality care, see George F. Indest III & Barbara A. Egolf, Is Medicine Headed for an Assembly
Line? Exploring the Doctrine of the Unauthorized Corporate Practice of Medicine, 6 BUS. L.
TODAY 32, 33-34 (1997); John V. Jacobi, Patients at a Loss: Protecting Health Care
Consumers Through Data Driven Quality Assurance, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 705, 705-09 (1997);
Jack K. Kilcullen, Groping for the Reins" ERISA, HMO Malpractice, and Enterprise Liability,
22 AM. J. L, & MED. 7, 8-10 (1996); Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New
Approach to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health Care, 72 IND. L. J. 1015, 1016-18 (1997);
John P. Little, D.M.D., Note, Managed Care Contracts ofAdhesion: Terminating the Doctor-
Patient Relationship and Endangering Patient Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1397, 1397-1401
(1997); Jonathan Gardner & Eric Weissenstein, Washington Report: Election-Year Alert:
Consumer Pressure May Drive Reforms in Health Care Fraud, Managed Care, MODERN
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maintain that they offer medical care that is both cost-effective and of
high quality, critics contend that cost control has predominated at the
expense of quality-with dangerous and unjust consequences for the
persons enrolled in these plans.3 This struggle between providing
high-quality health care and containing the cost of medical treatment
serves as the back-drop for the issue of managed care tort liability.
While physicians and other health care providers4 have long faced
liability for the consequences of their own malpractice, managed care
HEALTHCARE, Jan. 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7268904; Linda A. Johnson, Field hearing
addresses complaints about managed health care, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Jan. 22,
1998, available in 1998 WL 7378604 ("Sen. Robert Torricelli and Rep. Frank Pallone heard
testimony about problems with managed care and suggestions on how Congress can protect the
public from abuses."); Barbara Marsh, HMO Drug Lists New Focus of Backlash: Health care
critics charge that managed care firms limit the medications doctors can prescribe in a bid to
save money, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1998, at DI; Troy May, Doctors Back Managed Care
Liability Bill, CINCINATrI BUS. COURIER, Jan. 23, 1998, at 21; All Things Considered (National
Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 28, 1998) (transcript on file with the author) (interview with Kaiser
Permanente nurses striking to protest unsatisfactory pay and falling standards of patient care in
this HMO). But see Rhonda L. Rundle & Laurie McGinley, Medicine: California Voters Are
Cool to "Hot" HMO Issue, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 1996, at BI ("[P]eople are more worried
about the security of their medical coverage than about its quality.").
3. The American Medical Association has expressed concern that HMOs will mandate
that physicians in their employ base their treatment decisions on the interests of the HMOs in
lieu of their patients' welfare. See Vemellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and
Financial Risk Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 11, 31 (1993), cited in Jim M. Perdue & Stephen R. Baxley,
Cutting Costs-Cutting Care: Can Texas Managed Health Care Systems and HMOs Be Liable
for the Medical Malpractice of Physicians?, 27 ST. MARY'S L. J. 23, 67 n.12 (1995). Managed
care directors (and their employer-customers) are sensitive to this criticism, as illustrated by the
following assertion in an employee handbook: "Managed care is not cost control."
NATIONSBANK ASSOCIATE HANDBOOK § 5.5. Additionally, while they defend their industry
against charges of sacrificing patient care in order to reduce costs, managed care executives
continue to insist that the high price of health care poses a greater threat to American consumers
than do issues of quality. See Julius A. Karash, Managed-carefirms in area not enthusiastic
about bill, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 29, 1998, at A1O (statement of Jan Stallmeyer, executive
director of Principal Health Care of Kansas City) ("True consumer protection begins with
consumers having access to care they can afford, and whose quality is assured. And managed
care has worked hard to do that.")
4. In this note, the term "provider" refers to any medical personnel who administers
treatment or care to patients. To wit, CIGNA HealthCare uses "provider" to refer to a "doctor,
hospital, laboratory, nurse, or anyone who delivers medical or health related care." See CIGNA
HEALTHCARE HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 20. While beyond the scope of this Note, many
physicians bristle at the term "provider," which to some signifies the end of physician
autonomy and prestige and the advent of the doctor's role as a mere managed care employee.
See Brigid McMenamin, Crusader, FORBES, Mar. 9, 1998, 102 (Statement of Jane Orient,
M.D., executive director of the Association of American Physicians & Surgeons) ("I'm a
doctor, not a 'provider."').
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol55/iss1/8
1999] MALPRACTICE LIABILITY UNDER AN AMENDED ERISA 163
organizations thus far have enjoyed immunity from malpractice suits
due to language in the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act
(ERISA) that exempts employee benefit plans from state law
provisions.5 Certain bills currently under consideration in Congress
would remove this immunity so that patients injured due to the denial
of coverage for treatments could recover damages from their health
insurance organizations under state tort law or federal law.6
This Note proposes the adoption of legislation that would remove
ERISA's exemption of employee health plans from state tort law
liability. Pursuing this course of action would not come free of
certain undesirable results; however, it presents the least federally
intrusive way to ensure that managed care organizations are held
fully accountable for the medical decisions their own directors and
case reviewers make. Among possible maleffects of this proposal is
the potential for higher health care premiums as health plans try to
avoid litigation by authorizing more and costlier procedures and to
defend and insure against lawsuits formerly prohibited by ERISA.
These higher costs could make it prohibitively expensive for
employers to provide health benefits for their employees and thereby
could further reduce the ranks of Americans with access to health
insurance. Imposing direct accountability on these organizations,
however, is the solution most likely to spur those who determine
treatment coverage to make decisions with a sharper focus on patient
well-being. Moreover, allowing enrollees to sue their health care
plans when policy decisions result in patient injury merely removes
the special protection that does not shield any other health care
decision-maker. Finally, this proposal would not impose any intrusive
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994). See 61 AM. JUR. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other
Healers, § 200 (1981):
The welfare of the citizens of a state . . . demands that those persons practicing
medicine and surgery shall be duly able and careful. This rule['s] ... purpose is to
protect the health and lives of the public ... from careless, unskillful, or negligent
medical practitioners by making such practitioners answerable in damages to their
patients for failure to employ the requisite care, skill, or knowledge in the performance
of their professional duties.
6. This note will examine various congressional proposals aimed at making managed
care organizations answerable in court for the unwarranted withholding of health care coverage.
See infra notes 70-92 and accompanying text.
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government-mandated operating requirements on managed care
organizations and would keep malpractice suits in the state realm.
Part I of this Note examines the history of employee health care
plans, ERISA, the problems that have resulted under the current
system, and the current legislative proposals for correcting the flaws
that relate to ERISA and benefit plans. Part II analyzes these
proposals for reform and notes their effects on the plan beneficiaries,
employers, and managed care organizations likely to be affected by
any change of health care coverage policy or of ERISA. Part III
includes the author's proposal for a law that balances the sometimes
competing interests of beneficiaries, employers, insurers, and sound
public policy. This proposal incorporates elements of the various
congressional plans.
I. HISTORY EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH CARE PLANS
Over seventy-five percent of U.S. physicians now participate in
some form of managed care. There are now approximately 160
million Americans enrolled in managed care plans.8 This marks a
drastic change from traditional health care insurance known as "fee-
for-service" or "indemnity" coverage.9 Under these traditional plans,
insurance companies pay physicians for each procedure or office visit
on behalf on the insured. As health care costs increased dramatically
in the 1980s, employers looked to managed care as a way to control
7. Barry R. Furrow et al., HEALTH LAW 97 (Supp. 1995), cited in Barbara A. Noah, The
Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to the Realities of Cost
Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1219 (1997). This figure includes a variety of
arrangements, from working as an employee of a health maintenance organization, to treating
some patients enrolled in a managed care plan while owning one's own practice. Id. at 1219-20.
"In essence, managed care is a system combining insurance (i.e., financing) with health care
delivery." Phyllis C. Borzi, Managed Care and ERSA Health Plans, FIDUCIARY
RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES UNDER ERISA-1996 Q245 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 133, 135
(1996).
8. President Clinton's State of the Union Address (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 27, 1998).
Approximately two-thirds of those persons are beneficiaries of HMO plans, while the other
one-third receive health care through other types of managed care organizations. Noah, supra
note 7, at 1219-20.
9. Borzi, supra note 7, at 135. In 1987, over half of the physicians in the United States
were self-employed, solo practitioners, or were partners in small physician groups and received
payment from fee-for-service insurance plans; by 1993, however, only 37 percent of physicians
practiced in this manner. Furrow, supra note 7, at 97.
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the cost of the health benefits they purchase on behalf of their
employees.' 0
Managed care organizations (MCOs) include several different
types of organizations designed to provide health care to plan
enrollees while using various methods to contain the costs of the care.
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) function simultaneously
as health care insurer and provider. 1 These organizations contract
with physicians to provide all of the care required by the person
enrolled for a set periodic rate.' 2 This per-patient basis for payment is
known as "capitation." Under this system, the insurer pays a set fee to
the enrollee's physician regardless of the cost of the care actually
provided to the enrollee during the period.13 There are three basic
types of HMOs: the "staff" model,' 4 the "group" model,' 5 and the
"independent practice association" model. 16
Preferred provider organizations (PPOs) constitute another kind of
managed care delivery system. PPOs contract with physicians,
physician groups, and hospitals to provide care for enrollees on a
10. Borzi, supra note 7, at 135. Health care costs in the United States now amount to
approximately 14 % of U.S. GDP and have increased at an average rate of 4.8% per year
between 1960 and 1993. CENSUS BUREAU STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1996, at 111, cited in Noah,
supra note 7, at 1221.
11. Ila S. Rothschild, et al. Recent Developments in Managed Care, 32 ToRT & INS. L.J.
463, 464 (1997).
12. Id.
13. Noah, supra note 7, at 1223. For an analysis of the cost-saving benefits and the care-
compromising risks of capitation, see Frances H. Miller, Foreword: The Promise and Problems
of Capitation, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 167, 167-70 (1996); Capitation & Physician Autonomy:
Master of the Universe or Just Another Prisoner's Dilemma?, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 89, 89-93
(1996); Andrew Ruskin, Capitation: The Legal Implications of Using Capitation to Affect
Physician Decision-Making Processes, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 391, 391-92
(1997); Michelle M. Kwon, Comment, Move Over Marcus Welby, M.D., and Make Way for
Managed Care: The Implications of Capitation, Gag Clauses, and Economic Credentialing, 28
TEX. TECH L. REv. 829, 829-31 (1997).
14. Under the staff model, physicians work as salaried employees of the HMO at a central
location and earn fixed per-patient fees. Noah, supra note 7, at 1223.
15. In the group model HMOs, physicians, through partnerships or corporations, form
contracts with the HMO to provide care for the HMO enrollees. These physicians treat enrollees
at the group facility for a set fee per enrollee. Id. at 1223-24.
16. Independent physician associations (IPAs) operate through contracts between
physicians (usually in partnerships or corporations) and the HMO. Under this arrangement, the
physicians see patients in their own facilities and often do not work exclusively with the HMO.
The IPAs receive capitation fees from the HMO and in turn pay their member physicians based
on independent contracts between the IPAs and the physicians. Id. at 1224.
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reduced fee-for-service basis, as contrasted with the capitation
agreements under the HMO form. 17 Under this plan, enrollees may
receive care from unaffiliated physicians; however, the PPO provides
disincentives (such as larger copayments 18 and deductibles 19 for the
enrollee) for visiting "nonpreferred providers."20
Other forms of managed care include the exclusive provider
organization (EPO) and the point of service (POS) plan.21 Under the
EPO, certain physicians and health care facilities provide to
subscribers only the authorized medical services within the plan.22 A
POS plan resembles aspects of both the HMO and the PPO. When
enrollees select physicians within the plan, the organization pays the
physicians as they would under an HMO. Under the POS scheme,
though, enrollees may choose physicians outside the plan. When
beneficiaries choose providers outside the plan, they must pay higher
deductibles and co-payments.23
Managed care organizations control costs through a variety of
means. One such strategy is utilization review. 4 Utilization review
saves costs by allowing the managed care organization to determine
the procedures for which it will pay based on what it deems
medically necessary and effective.25 Managed care organizations hail
17. Noah, supra note 7, at 1225. The fee is "reduced" because the PPO contracts to pay
the physician much less than the amount the physician charges for a given procedure or office
visit. See Kevin Grumbach, Mechanisms for Controlling Costs, J. AM. MED. ASS'N, April 19,
1995, at 15; Thomas Bodenheimer, Reimbursing Physicians and Hospitals, J. AM. MED. ASS'N,
Sept. 28, 1994, at 12.
18. Copayment refers to the "dollar amount [the enrollee] must pay directly to the
provider for office-based physician care." NATIONSBANK ASSOCIATE HANDBOOK, supra note
3, at § 5.3.
19. A deductible is "the portion of covered medical expenses [the enrollee] pay[s] before
the plan starts to pay any benefit." Id.
20. Noah, supra note 7, at 1225.
21. Rothschild, supra note 11, at 465.
22. Bryan A. Liang, An Overview and Analysis of Challenges to Medical Exclusive
Contracts, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 1-3 (1997). These exclusive provider contracts, however, can
pose antitrust problems for the HMOs and physicians. See Mark L. Glassman, Can HMOs
Wield Market Power? Assessing Antitrust Liability in the Imperfect Market for Health Care
Financing, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 91, 135-37 (1996).
25. Smeeta S. Rishi, Getting a Jump on the Jargon: Beware the Gag Clauses on Ids, 6
BUS. LAW TODAY, 9, 9 (1997).
24. Rothschild, supra note 11, at 463-64.
25. Utilization reviews can operate prospectively or retrospectively. when performed
prospectively, utilization reviews allow plans to monitor and control the care provided by
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol55/iss1/8
1999] MALPRACTICE LIABILITY UNDER AN AMENDED ERISA 167
utilization review as a way to assure that physicians under the plan do
not provide medically unnecessary treatment.26
Another important cost-containing method under managed care is
the requirement that patients use primary care physicians who carry
the responsibility for ordering services, lab tests, and procedures for
patients, and who alone can refer patients to more expensive
specialists. 27 Using such "gatekeeper" primary care physicians has
the effect of reducing visits to specialists with a corresponding
requiring the physician or patient to obtain approval before dispensing or receiving treatment.
See id. at 464. Examples of prospective utilization review include precertification of hospital
stays, reviews of requests for extended hospital stays, and permission for procedures like
surgery and radiation. Managed care organizations use retrospective utilization review to assess
the quality and necessity of services already performed. Under the traditional system, insurers
employed utilization review retrospectively to gauge the kind of treatment doctors provided
insured patients for statistical purposes as well as to determine future insurance rates. A
traditional indemnity plan also could refuse to pay the doctor's bill if the treatment in issue
were clearly something not covered under the policy. See Vemellia R. Randall, Managed Care,
Utilization Review, and Financial Risk Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost
Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1994). Managed care plans employ
these techniques retrospectively largely to review providers for providing what the plan deems
excessive treatment. This review policy allows plans to track physicians' performance and to
terminate providers who prescribe procedures that plan administrators think excessive or
inappropriate. Health plans also perform utilization review to manage ongoing treatment when a
patient suffers a serious or chronic illness or injury. See Alycia C. Regan, Note, Regulating the
Business of Medicine: Models for Integrating Ethics and Managed Care, 30 COLUM. J. L. &
SOC. PROBS. 635, 684 n.14 (1997). Under capitation-based plans, administrators use utilization
review to ascertain that physicians, who receive one lump sum per patient, are not withholding
treatment. Rothschild, supra note 11, at 464.
26. Rothschild, supra note I1, at 464. Critics of managed care-both patient/consumer
advocates and physicians-cite utilization review as a particularly objectionable aspect of
managed care. Physicians resent the interference with their medical judgment and autonomy to
prescribe the treatments they think most likely to result in favorable outcomes for their patients.
See Robert M. Goldberg, What's Happened to the Healing Process?, WALL ST. J., June 18,
1997, at A22. Patient advocates worry that utilization review results in the denial of necessary
treatment by plan employees under pressure to reduce costs as much as possible. See Jamie
Court, HMOs Continue to Evade Accountability, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Jan. 27, 1998, at A7.
One author noted the story of a boy whose health plan denied his parents' request for an MRi to
detect the source of the boy's lingering pain after a serious head injury. Although the persons
conducting the utilization review knew that the boy's pain could stem from an injury-induced
abscess, they persisted in suggesting the flu or meningitis as the cause, and refused to allow the
$800 MRI. As his parents feared, the child's head injury had led to a brain abscess, which had
caused his continuing pain. The abscess thus went untreated during a critical period and resulted
in blindness and cerebral palsy for the child. See Goldberg, supra at A22.
27. Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care: Incentive Payments to Physicians,
22 AM. J. L. & MED. 399,401 (1996).
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decrease in the costs incurred by such visits.
28
Managed care organizations also restrict hospitalization by
directing doctors to perform more procedures on an outpatient basis29
and by limiting the amount of time they permit patients to remain in
the hospital.3 ° Managed care organizations also have included "gag
clauses" in their contracts with physicians.31 These restrictions on
provider-patient communication reduce costs if the patient's
consumption of expensive care declines as a result of his lack of
information about "noncovered" care. 2 Other cost-containment
28. Id. One managed care organization explains the benefits of requiring enrollees always
to consult their primary care physician first for any medical problem: "Less need for specialists.
By seeing your primary care physician first, you may not even need to see a specialist. This
means faster recovery and lower costs." NATIONSBANK ASSOCIATE HANDBOOK, supra note 3,
at § 5.8 (emphasis added). According to one author, these plans also reward primary care
gatekeepers for reducing the number of referrals to specialists and the consequent cost of
specialty services. See Latham, supra note 27, at 399.
29. Between 1980 and 1993, outpatient hospital procedures increased by more than 34
percent, due to both new technologies and managed care cost-reducing pressures. See Sarah Q.
Duffy, Dean E. Farley, Patterns of Decline Among Inpatient Procedures, U. S. Dep't HHS,
Public Health Rep. 1995; 110: 674-681 Nov. 1995-Dec. 1995, available in LEXIS, Health
Library, Alljnl File.
30. "If there is a difference of opinion between your physician and the medical consultant
regarding the length of your hospital stay, coverage ofroom and board charges associated with
the disputed hospital days will be denied." NATIONSBANK ASSOCIATE HANDBOOK, supra note
3, at § 5.4 (emphasis in the original). Examples of managed care restrictions include the policy
of some organizations to limit maternity hospital stays to twenty-four hours, a practice managed
care critics have termed "drive-through deliveries." These limitations incited a public outcry
and prompted many state legislatures, as well as Congress, to enact bills requiring insurers to
cover longer hospital stays for maternity patients. See Suzanne Seaman, Comment, Putting the
Brakes on Drive-Through Deliveries, 13 J. CONTEMP. H. L. & POL'Y 497, 497-500, 502-04
(1997), David S. Hilzenrath, Backlash Builds over Managed Care: Frustrated Consumers Push
for Tougher Laws, WASH. POST, June 30, 1997, at Al. Similar practices of requiring surgeons
to perform mastectomies in an outpatient setting have angered patient advocates and inspired
legislation prohibiting this policy. See Minimum Mastectomy Debate Heats Up, MED.
OUTCOMES AND GUIDELINES ALERT, Nov. 20, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library,
Allnws File (thirteen states have passed laws requiring health plans to allow mastectomy
patients to remain in the hospital as long as their physicians deem appropriate).
31. The term "gag clause" refers to a provision in a physician's contract with a managed
care organization that forbids the physician to discuss "noncovered" available treatment with a
patient. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural Protections for Patients in Capitated Health Plans,
22 AM. J. L. & MED. 301, 319 (1996).
32. Critics have condemned the explicit and implicit "gag" rules imposed on physicians.
See Julia A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Gag Clauses in
Physician Contracts, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 433, 443 (1996). Martin and Bjerknes cite four areas
of restricted physician-patient speech under these gag rules. These include restraints on
physicians discussing the full range of available treatment options with their patients, bans on
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methods include refusals to cover therapy deemed by the
organization to be "experimental"; upper limits or maximum quotas
on primary care gatekeepers' referral of patients to outside services;
and withholding some of each physician's payment to create a fund
to cover specialists' costs when the plan determines that enrollees
have overused these specialists' services.33 Additionally, some types
of payment systems used by managed care organizations furnish
incentives for physicians to keep costs as low as possible.34 Finally,
the plans structure some explicit incentives for physicians to reduce
costs. By paying the physicians year-end bonuses out of pools set up
for specialist treatment and other ancillary services, some plans create
physicians revealing the plan's payment and incentive structure, prohibitions against physicians
discussing other health care providers with their patients, and prohibitions against physicians
participating in political debate relating to health care. See id. See also Jennifer L. D'Isidori,
Stop Gagging Physicians!, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 187, 194-99 (1997). While critics of managed
care have denounced gag rules, managed care organizations dispute the prevalence and purpose
of such clauses. See The News Hour with Jim Lehrer: A Bill of Health (PBS television
broadcast, Feb. 5, 1998) (transcript on file with the author); Frank Bass, Insurer Alters "Gag
Rule" after Outcry, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1996 at TI. Bill Gradison, president of the Health
Insurance Association of America, an organization composed of managed care companies,
admitted that gag clauses did exist in physician-managed care organization contracts at one
time, but insisted that the industry had changed with respect to this practice, "without the
necessity of passing laws to [bring about the change]." See NewsHour, supra. Public pressure in
Texas forced the HMO Humana, Inc. to abandon its policy of requiring physicians to contact its
hospital preadmission review department "before conveying the possibility of admission to [a]
plan member." See Bass, supra, at TI. A spokesman for Humana defended the policy as simply
a means of ensuring that physicians do not confuse patients by leading them to believe that a
noncovered treatment is actually covered. See id.
Several states have passed laws banning gag rules. See id. Missouri, for example, enacted
such a measure as part of its managed care reform bill in 1997. See H.B. 335, 89th Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997). Section 354.441 of the bill provides:
No health maintenance organization plan, medical group/staff model, independent
practice association or other entity shall prohibit or restrict any provider from
disclosing to any subscriber, enrollee or member any information that such provider
deems appropriate regarding the nature of treatment, risks or alternatives thereto, the
availability of other therapy, consultation or test, the decision of any plan to authorize
or deny services, or the process that the plan or any person contracting with the plan
uses or proposes to use, to authorize or deny health care services or benefits.
33. Noah, supra note 7, at 1226.
34. By paying physicians either on a salary or a capitation basis, some of these
organizations ensure that physicians, who are paid one fee regardless of the amount of care they
provide, will have a financial interest in providing the least amount of care possible. See
Latham, supra note 27, at 404-05.
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a disincentive for physicians to refer patients to specialists.3 5 Other
plans pay physicians the amount of their fees withheld by the plan
throughout the year minus any amount spent on specialists'
services.
36
A. ERISA
Congress established ERISA in 1974 to protect employees'
retirement accounts and general benefit plans.37 The drafters of the
legislation intended it to deter mismanagement and abuse of
employee benefit funds and to establish a mechanism for the uniform
regulation of pensions. 3
In order to facilitate this uniformity in benefit administration, the
authors of ERISA included in it an express preemption clause, which
35. Id. Under some state laws, managed care companies have had to strike or restructure
mechanisms like this, which encourage physicians to limit referrals to specialists. See Letter to
Provider, Amendment to HealthLink HMO Agreement, Jan. 15, 1998 (on file with the author).
In this letter, HealthLink, an HMO, informs its providers about the amendments to the
HealthLink provider-HMO contract under Missouri's revised health insurance laws. Id The
letter states in relevant part, "House Bill 335 requires that contracts and arrangements do not
'induce a provider to limit, restrict or deny access to, or delivery of, medical or other services
prior to the delivery of such services.' Accordingly, we are eliminating the primary care
physician incentive program." Id. HealthLink states that "[t]he purpose of the [incentive]
program was to provide incentives for effective management of utilization." Id.
36. Latham, supra note 27, at 404-05. Latham asserts that insurers increasingly use these
kinds of incentives for physicians to provide less care and cheaper care. He cites a survey
showing that approximately half of American physicians have at least some patients whose
plans use capitation, or payment withholding mechanisms in fee-for-service schemes. See id. at
405 (citing Physician Payment Review Committee, Physician Practices Report, at 46,846).
37. Perdue & Baxley, supra note 3, at 59. The bill's sponsor, Sen. Javits, described
ERISA's purpose as "maintain[ing] the voluntary growth of private [pension and employee
benefit] plans while at the same time making needed structural reforms in such areas as vesting,
funding, termination, etc. so as to safeguard workers against loss of their earned or anticipated
benefits .... " See Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted, in U.S. Senate
Special Comm. On Aging, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., The Employee Retirement Security Act of
1974: The First Decade 25 (Comm. Print 1984), cited in Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The
Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56
OHIO ST. L. J. 153, 169 n.57 (1995), cited in Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and
Regulation of Managed Health Care: The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J. L. & MED.
251,251 (1997).
38. Farrell, supra note 37, at 260. Under ERISA, employee plans are of two types:
pension, which provides income deferral or retirement income; and welfare, under which plans
administer "medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, or death." See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1).
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makes nugatory all state law that "relates to" employee benefit
plans.39 The Supreme Court has interpreted the preemption clause as
preempting any state law with "a connection with or reference to
such a plan." 40 Although it would seem from the language of the
preemption clause that ERISA would preempt any state law action
that a plaintiff would bring against a plan, this is not the case.41 Under
ERISA's "savings clause," ERISA reserves to the states their
traditional right to regulate insurance.42 Thus, the Supreme Court has
held that the savings clause allows a state to require its insurers to
provide a particular benefit under its power to regulate the business
of insurance.43 Under the savings clause, however, state law causes of
action for improper processing of benefit claims do not constitute the
regulation of the business of insurance and so fall subject to ERISA
preemption. 44 The "deemer" clause prevents self-insured employee
benefit plans from regulation by state insurance laws by deeming
them not insurance companies for the purposes of the savings
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (1988). Section 514 of ERISA states that "except as provided in
sub-section (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter... shall supercede any and all
state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." Id.
40. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,97 (1983).
41. ERISA contains a "savings" clause, which preserves states' rights to regulate
insurance, banking, and securities. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). The savings clause expressed
Congress' desire not to supplant all state laws regulating other areas of insurance long overseen
by states. The Supreme Court has applied a three-pronged test to determine whether a state law
regulates the business of insurance for savings clause purposes. The first step entails
determining "whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's
risk." Second, a practice concerns the business of regulating insurance if it "is an integral part
of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured." Finally, the practice regulates
the business of insurance if it also "is limited to entities within the insurance industry." See
Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982), cited in Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985) (holding a state law requiring health insurance
plans to cover treatment of mental illness satisfied the provisions of the savings clause as a
practice regulating the business of insurance). ERISA's "deemer" clause sets forth that
employee benefit plans shall not be considered "insurance compan[ies] or other insurer[s] ... or
to be engaged in the business of insurance ... for the purpose of any law." See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144 (bX2)(B). Thus, the deemer clause prevents self-insured employee benefits plans from
falling under state insurance regulations. See Farrell, supra note 37, at 263.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XA). See supra note 41 for an explanation of the operation of
the savings clause.
43. Union LaborLife Ins. Co, 458 U.S. at 129.
44. Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1987). For the test to determine
whether a law concerns the regulation of the business of insurance, see supra note 41.
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clause.45
The Supreme Court held in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines that "[s]ome
state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous,
remote or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law
"relates to" the plan.' ' 6 Some courts thus have allowed plaintiffs to
bring actions against such plans on vicarious liability theories, where
the plan was at fault for hiring and retaining physicians who
themselves were liable for malpractice.47 A California case suggested
the possibility of liability for managed care organizations if their
cost-containment policies result in a violation of a standard of care.48
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). The term "self-insured" refers to the practice of some
employers of insuring their employee benefits plans themselves, instead of through a third party
insurer or an HMO. See Farrell, supra note 37, at 263.
46. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21 (citing AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118,
121 (2d Cir. 1979)). See supra note 41 for a discussion of the deemer clause.
47. See Noah, supra note 7, at n.1 19 (citing Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59
F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995); Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113, 117-18 (D. Md. 1996); Jackson
v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820, 825 (D. Md. 1995); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F.
Supp. 544, 548 (S.D. Ill. 1994)). In Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir.
1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 564 (1995), the Third Circuit held that when a plaintiff sues a
plan for negligence due to the poor quality of the services rendered, this does not fall within the
purview of ERISA's civil enforcement provision, § 502 (a)(l)(B), and thus state courts can
apply state tort law to the matter. Dukes involved two cases in which the plaintiffs brought
claims for wrongful death based on theories of indirect and direct negligence. The plaintiffs
based their indirect negligence claims on an ostensible agency theory and claimed that the
managed care organization had held out the allegedly negligent physicians as agents and thus
should incur liability when the physicians negligently failed to administer proper care. Dukes,
57 F.3d at 352-53. The plaintiffs sued for direct negligence based on theories of negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision of the physicians. Id. The court acknowledged that plaintiffs
find their only remedies for denial of benefits, enforcement of their rights under their health
plans, and requests for future benefits under ERISA's civil enforcement provision. Id. at 356.
The claims at issue in Dukes, however, addressed the quality of the plaintiffs' benefits, for
which ERISA's civil enforcement clause does not provide a remedy. Id. Thus, the court
concluded that it should remand these negligence issues to the state court. Id.
48. See Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). In this case a
patient sued her insurer for its decision to require her discharge from the hospital four days
earlier than the time initially recommended by her surgeon. The patient developed
complications after her release, which resulted in the amputation of her leg. Id, at 668. The
treating physician asserted that the patient's leg would not have required amputation had she
been allowed to remain in the hospital, because her post-operative problems would have been
diagnosed and treated in a timely manner. Id. at 662. The court did not hold the insurer liable,
based on its finding that the company's utilization review consultant had not breached relevant
medical standards of care in prescribing the earlier discharge. Id. at 670-7 1. The court further
held, though, that had the organization's utilization review process violated the standard of care
in its decision to withhold payment for further hospitalization, it could have been held liable. Id.
at 671. While the organization did recommend this earlier release, the patient's physician still
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The holding of this case, however, seems limited to plan decisions
that amount to a mistaken or medically insufficient recommendation
under the plan utilization review process.49
To mark the boundaries of ERISA preemption more clearly, the
Supreme Court expanded on its Shaw definition of "relate to" in New
York Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co.50 In this case, the Court upheld a New York state law which
imposed surcharges on certain health insurers.5' ERISA did not
preempt the rate-setting scheme because it did not require plans to
provide any particular benefits, and its effect on the health plans was
too indirect to "relate to" the plans for the purposes of ERISA.52
By contrast, courts have dismissed state actions brought by
plaintiffs for a plan's denial of certain benefits. Courts have held that
these coverage denials "relate to" the plan and thus fall under the
preemption clause of ERISA.53 Furthermore, when an action "relates
carried potential liability, for he had the burden of appealing any decisions made by the
organizations that he believed would deprive the patient of adequate care. Id. at 671.
49. The case of Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), illustrates
the potential for organizational liability when a plan mistakenly denies benefits authorized
under its terms. In Wilson, the court found it possible that an insured person's suicide stemmed
from the plan's refusal to pay for the length of hospitalization deemed necessary by the
insured's psychiatrist. Id. at 883. The organization had told the treating physician that it
disagreed with the doctor's assessment of the patient's need for hospitalization and would pay
for only eleven days' hospitalization, not the three to four weeks recommended by the doctor.
Id. at 882. The patient lacked the resources to pay for the remainder of the time and thus had to
leave the hospital. Id.
Twenty days after his release, the patient committed suicide. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
The court refused to exempt the company from tort liability and relied on common law tort
causation principles to arrive at its decision. Id. at 883.
50. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
51. Id. at 1682.
52. Id. at 1679. The Court found this rate surcharge system was intended to aid plans that
insure higher risk patients by making these companies more competitive with commercial
insurers. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1678. According to the Court, the surcharges system had only
an "'indirect economic influence ... [and] does not bind plan administrators to any particular
choice of benefits .... " Id. at 1679.
53. Noah, supra note 7, at 1243. See Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57
(1987). In this case, the Court held that ERISA preempted a bad faith breach of contract claim
against the insurer of the plaintiff's disability benefits. Id. The Court reasoned that Congress
had intended that ERISA would furnish the exclusive remedy for improper administration of
benefits. Id. at 52-54.
With respect to denials of coverage, health plans typically include clauses in their
beneficiary handbooks listing procedures for which the plans will not pay. Additional clauses
disclaim liability for the costs of treatment designated as "experimental" or "investigatory."
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to" an ERISA-covered plan, an enrollee's exclusive remedy is
provided under ERISA sections 502 and 409.54 These ERISA
remedies can prove insufficient, however, in which case an injured
enrollee can find himself with no remedy available under either state
or federal law. Corcoran v. United Health Care, Inc. illustrates such
a situation.55
In Corcoran, Florence Corcoran, an employee of South Central
Bell Telephone Company, had obtained insurance through Bell's
Medical Assistance Plan, an ERISA-qualified plan.56 Mrs. Corcoran
became pregnant, and her obstetrician diagnosed her condition as
high-risk. The obstetrician recommended bed rest during the final
Borzi, supra note 7, at 136-37. Plaintiffs then bring claims to protest a plan's denial of coverage
for treatment such as bone marrow transplants with high doses ofchemotherapy. Ordinarily the
plans grant their medical directors the ultimate authority to determine what constitutes
"experimental" and "investigatory." Borzi, supra note 8, at 136-37. Many courts have upheld
the rights of the plan to determine which categories of care it will not cover and have allowed
the plans significant leeway in determining what constitutes "experimental therapy." See
Peruzzi v. Summa Medical Plan, 137 F.3d 431, 433 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding high dose
chemotherapy and bone marrow transplant for breast cancer reasonably could have been
considered experimental and so excluded from coverage); Turner v. Fallon Community Health
Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196, 200 (Ist Cir. 1997) (holding ERISA preempted state law wrongful
death claim, based on improper denial of bone marrow transplant with high dose chemotherapy
for metatastic breast cancer); Painter v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 436, 439 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding state law contract claim for bad faith denial of cancer treatment was preempted by
ERISA); Cannon v. Group Health Serv. Of Oklahoma, 77 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding denial of coverage for a bone marrow transplant for leukemia was preempted by
ERISA); Variety Children's Hospital v. Century Medical Health Plan, 57 F.3d 1040, 1042 (1Ith
Cir. 1995) (holding a hospital's suit to compel payment by HMO for high dose chemotherapy
and bone marrow transplant preempted by ERISA); Hubbard v. Blue Cross & F.3d 942, 945
(5th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiffs state law fraudulent inducement claim that unclear plan
language led her to believe her ovarian cancer treatment would be covered was preempted by
ERISA); Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan of Northern Indiana, Inc., 19 F.3d 322, 327 (7th
Cir. 1994) (holding that the plain language of the plan allowed administrators to deny coverage
of bone marrow transplant and high dose chemotherapy for a young patient even though
physicians deemed this not experimental for young patients); Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA
Medical and Benefits Plan, 959 F.2d 569, 578 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding state law fraudulent
inducement and breach of contract claims were preempted by ERISA when the health plan
refused to pay for certain cancer treatment).
54. ERISA allows beneficiaries to sue in federal court to "recover benefits due under the
terms of [their] plans, to enforce [their] rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify [their]
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." See 29 U.S.C. § 1 132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
ERISA § 503(a)(1) also requires that a plan's denial of care for particular treatment "set forth
specific reasons for the denial."
55. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
56. Id. at 1323.
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months of Mrs. Corcoran's pregnancy; however, the plan
administrators denied her request for temporary disability benefits for
the last months of her pregnancy.5 7 Due to this denial, the obstetrician
wrote to Bell's medical consultant to advise him that Mrs. Corcoran
was carrying a high-risk pregnancy. The plan's medical consultant
inquired about Mrs. Corcoran's condition, and his consulting
specialist, an obstetrician, explained that the company was pursuing a
risky course in ignoring Mrs. Corcoran's obstetrician's
recommendation. 58 As Mrs. Corcoran approached her due date, her
doctor ordered hospitalization to allow for full-time fetal
monitoring. 59 Mrs. Corcoran's obstetrician requested pre-certification
for her hospitalization, as required under the terms of the health
plan.6° The organization, United HealthCare, however, refused this
request, reasoning that hospitalization was not medically necessary.61
In lieu of hospitalization, United provided for home monitoring by a
nurse.62 Following this denial of coverage, Mrs. Corcoran returned
home from the hospital, where she had stayed pending a decision by
the health plan. Thirteen days after Mrs. Corcoran had left the
hospital, the fetus became distressed and died during a period when
the nurse was off-duty.63
The Corcorans brought a wrongful death suit in Louisiana state
court against Blue Cross and United, as well as actions for loss of
consortium and aggravation of Mrs. Corcoran's depression.64
Defendants Blue Cross and United removed the case to federal
district court after convincing the court that the case "related to" an
ERISA-govemed plan.65 Blue Cross and United prevailed in district
court on ERISA preemption grounds as well, and the court granted
57, Id at 1322.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1322-23.
60. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1324.
61. The plan determined this through its utilization review procedure. Id. at 1322-24.
62, Id.
63. Id.
64, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama served as the administrator of the plan, while
United administered the plan's "Quality Care Program," which provided for pre-certification of
procedures and utilization review. Corcoran, 965 F. 2d at 1323.
65. Id. at 1324.
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their motion for summary judgment.66
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Corcorans
argued that the district court incorrectly held that ERISA pre-empted
their state tort action against United.67 The Fifth Circuit, however,
upheld the district court's decision, explaining that, although the
health plan did make determinations about medical matters, this did
not alter its status as shielded from state tort actions under ERISA.68
While the court viewed this result as "compelled" by ERISA, it noted
that the consequence of this decision was that "the Corcorans have no
remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious
mistake.,
69
B. Congressional Proposals for Managed Care Reform:
Patient Access to Responsible Care Act
To address the managed care organizations' perceived lack of
commitment to patients' health interests, as demonstrated by cases
like Corcoran, members of Congress have proposed various pieces of
managed care reform legislation.70 The bill proposed by Rep. Charles
Norwood and Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, the Patient Access to
Responsible Care Act (PARCA), includes a range of provisions
designed to further the interests of consumers and providers of
managed care.7' Provisions of the bill include those that guarantee
66. Id. at 1325.
67. Id. at 1326.
68. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331. "United makes medical decisions.... it does so in the
context of making a determination about the availability of benefits under the plan[,J ... [and]
the Louisiana tort action asserted by the Cororans... is pre-empted by ERISA." Id.
69. Id. at 1338. ERISA provided no remedy for the Corcorans either, for the court
determined that § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, which allows for "other equitable relief," did not include
damages for emotional distress. Because the plan had paid the actual medical expenses of Mrs.
Corcoran, § 502(a)(1)(B) was not an appropriate channel for relief. Id. at 1334-35.
70. Rep. Charles Norwood expressed his concern for the problems faced by patients and
providers operating under managed care: "We have seen an alarming number of horror stories
from around the country of patients denied access to necessary care, of providers being told
what they can tell their patients about treatment options, of denied reimbursement of
catastophic-level medical expenses because of fine-print technical clauses in insurance plans."
See HEALTH NEWS DAILY, April 23, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL, HND.
71. H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997). In the bill's opening statement, the sponsors have set
forth the purpose of the bill: "To amend the Public Health Service Act and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to establish standards for relationships between group
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enrollees access to care by specialists, require plan coverage of
emergency treatment without prior certification by health plan
administrators, ban "gag rules," require health plans to furnish
consumers with certain services such as fair and prompt utilization
reviews and payment of claims, and mandate that health plans follow
certain procedures for terminating physicians.72  While these
provisions address issues important to patients and providers alike,
the bill's proposed amendment of ERISA to allow plan enrollees to
sue their health plans for medical malpractice has attracted
considerable attention from insurance companies and managed care
organizations.73
Under ERISA as it currently exists, health plan beneficiaries
cannot bring suit against the plan for medical malpractice because
ERISA exempts such plans from state tort law under its preemption
clause.74 The PARCA amends ERISA to remove its clause
preempting state tort law in matters relating to employee benefit
plans.75
C. Managed Care Plan Accountability Act
While the Norwood-D'Amato bill would permit plaintiffs to bring
causes of action against ERISA under state tort law, a proposal
introduced by Reps. Pete Stark, Nita Lowey, George Miller, and Dale
Kildee would allow plaintiffs to sue in federal court for compensatory
and punitive damages currently denied under ERISA remedies.76
health plans and health insurance issuers with enrollees, health professionals, and providers."
Id.
72. HEALTH NEWS DAILY, supra note 70, at 1-2. See supra note 32 and accompanying
text for a discussion of gag rules.
73. See New Bill Opens Malpractice Door to Health Plans, MEDICAL INDUSTRY TODAY,
April 24, 1997, at 29, available in LEXIS, Genmed Library, Alljm File(describing the ERISA
amendment as "one of the most controversial provisions [of the PARCA]").
74. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for an explanation of ERISA's preemption
clause.
75. The PARCA amends § 514(b) of ERISA through the addition of the following
paragraph: "(9) Subsection (a) of this section shall not be construed to preclude any State cause
of action to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death against any person that
provides insurance or administrative services to or for an employee welfare benefit plan
maintained to provide health care benefits." See H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997).
76. See H.R. 1749, 105th Cong. (1997) ("Managed Care Plan Accountability Act"). See
also Health News Daily, May 23, 1997, available in WL, HND (summarizing the Managed
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Under the Stark-Kildee proposal, HMOs would face liability for
patient injuries that stem from their negligent actions-even if the
action at issue entailed merely administering the plan as designed.77
Furthermore, the Stark-Kildee bill would require plans to indemnify
providers for any malpractice liability they incur that results from a
plan's restrictions on provider-patient communications.78
Care Plan Accountability Act). Currently ERISA's civil enforcement provision allows civil
suits in certain circumstances. A plan participant or beneficiary may sue for damages when a
plan's administrators fail to provide certain information requested by the participant or
beneficiary or in order to recover benefits due him under the plan, to enforce his rights under
the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan. See
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(A) & (B). Additionally, a plan secretary, beneficiary, participant, or
fiduciary may sue for breaches of fiduciary duty imposed on plan fiduciaries by § 409(a)
ERISA. See ERISA § 502(a)(2). Designated persons also may sue for a plan's failure to abide
by the tax registration procedures of ERISA. See ERISA § 502(a)(4). Finally, a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary may bring suit to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of ERISA or the terms of the plan, or to obtain other appropriate equitable relief to
redress such violations or to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.
See § 502(a)(3)(A)-(3)(i)-(ii). The Supreme Court has held that § 502 (a) does not imply a
private right to extracontractual damages not provided in the sections of ERISA. See Varity v.
Howe, 515 U.S. 489,495 (1995); Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134, 148 (1985). Thus, "other equitable relief' excludes extracontractual remedies such as
punitive and pain and suffering damages for a private plaintiff. See Corcoran, 935 F.2d at 1338.
Rather, plaintiffs recover their exclusive remedies in the cost of the procedure that the plan
wrongfully denied to the plaintiff. See Corcoran, 935 F.2d at 1334-35. This civil enforcement
mechanism provides the remedy for the aggrieved beneficiary who seeks benefits due but
withheld from him under the plan. See ERISA § 502 (a)(1)(3). The Managed Care Plan
Accountability Act would amend ERISA § 502 (c) to provide:
In any case in which a group health plan, or a health insurance issuer offering health
insurance coverage in connection with such plan, provides benefits under such plan
under managed care, and such plan or issuer fails to provide any such benefit in
accordance with the terms of the plan or such coverage, insofar as such failure occurs
pursuant to a clinically or medically inappropriate decision or determination resulting
from--I) the application of any cost containment technique, (ii) any utilization review
directed at cost containment, or (iii) any other medical care delivery policy decision
which restricts the ability of providers of medical care from utilizing their full
discretion for treatment of patients, each specified defendant shall be jointly and
severally liable to any participant or beneficiary aggrieved by such failure for actual
damages (including compensatory and consequential damages) proximately caused by
such failure, and may, in the court's discretion, be liable to such participant or
beneficiary for punitive damages.
77. See HEALTH NEWS DAILY, supra note 70, at 1. Denying benefits available under the
plan would result in liability for the organization because the organizations control which
benefits they will cover, and their refusal to pay for procedures often determines the treatment
the patient will or will not receive. Id.
78. H.R. 1749, 105th Cong. § 2(b) (1997). The bill's sponsors thus have attempted to curb
the managed care organizations' temptations to impose gag rules on the providers with whom
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D. Patients 'Bill ofRights
In March, 1998, Rep. John Dingell introduced a Patients' Bill of
Rights in the House, and Senator Tom Daschle introduced a parallel
measure in the Senate. Both Patients' Bill of Rights proposals would
amend ERISA's preemption provision to allow for lawsuits in state
court against health plans and employers who sponsor them.79 In
addition to the ERISA amendment, these bills would impose
numerous requirements on health plans. Examples of such
requirements include: mandating that health plans allow beneficiaries
to use emergency services without obtaining prior authorization,80
requiring health plans to offer a point-of-service option to
beneficiaries, 8' and mandating that plan enrollees be allowed to
participate in clinical trials and that plans cover the costs associated
with such participation. 82
E. Other Managed Care Reform Proposals with Amendments to
ERISA
Also concerned about consumers' difficulties with managed care
plans, Rep. Marge Roukema introduced the Quality Health Care and
Consumer Protection Act.83 This bill would require all managed care
health plans to allow patients more choice of physicians; to pay for
more drugs, health devices, and experimental treatment; to eliminate
all gag rules; and to require plans to provide enrollees with
information about the plans' grievance procedures and financial
they contract.
79. See H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. (1998), S. 1890, 105th Cong. (1998). The bills would
permit suits against employers or other plan sponsors "only if [the lawsuit] is based on the
employer's or sponsor's exercise of discretionary authority to decide a claim for covered
benefits, and such exercise resulted in personal injury or wrongful death." H.R. 3605, § 302; S.
1890, § 302.
80. See H.R. 3605, § 101; S. 1890, § 101.
81. See H.IR 3605, § 102; S. 1890, § 102.
82. SeeH.R. 3605, § 106; . 1890, § 106.
83. H.R. 1222, 105th Cong. (1997). Rep. Roukema noted the "disturbing trend of the
health insurance industry putting bottom-line medicine ahead of quality medical care" and
urged her colleagues in the House not to "allow green-eyeshaded bean counters in insurance
company accounting departments" to rob Americans of their world renowned medical care. See
CONG. REC. E563 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1997) (statement ofRep. Roukema).
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arrangements with plan medical directors. 84 The bill adds the above
consumer protection provisions to ERISA as well, thus ensuring that
plans regulated under ERISA also will provide these services.85 Other
members of Congress also have proposed similar measures designed
to correct the perceived shortcomings of managed care plans.
86
While some bills have proposed sweeping legislation that would
mandate that managed care organizations provide certain benefits and
administrative procedures for their enrollees, other bills, like the
Norwood and Stark measures, remove the ERISA preemption shield
from managed care organizations. Rep. Pallone, for example,
introduced a bill that would amend § 514(b) of ERISA to allow
beneficiaries to sue health insurance companies in state court for
damages for personal injury or wrongful death.87 Similarly, Rep.
Valezquez's "Managed Care Bill of Rights for Consumers Act"
requires all managed care organizations to establish certain quality,
access, and procedural safeguards, and allows for state laws to
supercede the new ERISA provisions if they offer stricter standards
for patient care and service.
In contrast to the measures that would remove ERISA protection
for managed care organizations, however, Rep. Fawell has introduced
a bill that would extend ERISA preemption to health insurance
purchasing cooperatives organized through trade, business, and
84. H.R. 1222, 105th Cong. § 3(a) (1997).
85. Id. Rep. Roukema's bill would include all these provisions under ERISA at 29 U.S.C,
1185 et seq. by adding a new § 713. See H.R. 1222, 105th Cong. § 3 (1997).
86. Rep. Nadler's bill to reform managed care lists certain benefits and appeals procedures
managed care plans must provide their enrollees. This "Comprehensive Managed Health Care
Reform Act", like Rep. Roukema's bill, amends ERISA to guarantee that ERISA plans will
provide the enumerated benefits and services to their enrollees. See H.R. 2905, 105th Cong.
(1997). See also Sen. Kennedy's "Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act," which would amend
ERISA to guarantee ERISA plan beneficiaries improved access to emergency care, specialists,
the physicians of their choice, and prescription drugs; the right to participate in clinical trials;
and more efficient complaint and appeals procedures, among other provisions. S. 353, 105th
Cong. (1997). Rep. Lowey's managed care bill also would amend ERISA, albeit for the
narrower purpose of providing managed care plan enrollees with access to a wider range of
prescription drugs. See H..L 1525, 105th Cong. § 2(d) (1997).
87. H.R. 3009, 105th Cong. § 204 (1997). This "Health Care Consumer Protection Act"
also contains requirements for quality of care, access to care, information disclosure, and
appeals processes for providers. Id. at (I)-(III).
88. H.R. 2606, 105th Cong. § 3 (1997).
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professional associations.8 9 Rep. Fawell portrayed his bill as a means
of making health care accessible and affordable for those who work
in small businesses.9° The sponsors of this bill intended that these
newly formed Association Health Plans would help small businesses
by allowing them the efficiencies and effectiveness of collective
bargaining with providers and insurers and by allowing cost savings
through the ERISA preemption of state health care laws.91 Rep.
Fawell has criticized competing bills that would impose coverage and
operating requirements on health care insurers, thereby increasing
costs and making health insurance prohibitively expensive for
employers and employees.
92
II. THE EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED ERISA AMENDMENTS ON
MANAGED CARE
The proposed ERISA changes would affect health care
consumers, health care providers, managed care organizations, and
employers in different ways and to varying extents. Most of the
proposed reforms create the risk of increased costs for the managed
care organizations and the employers who provide benefits to their
employees.93 With respect to patients' interests, the proposals would
89. H.R. 1515, 105th Cong. (1997). Rep. Fawell has designated his measure the
"Expanded Portability and Health Insurance Coverage Act"
90. CONG. REC. E830 (daily ed. May 1, 1997) (statement of Rep. Fawell). In his speech
on the floor of the House, Rep. Fawell described the "problem of the uninsured, both children
and adults, [as] a problem of small businesses lacking access to affordable health coverage." Id.
91. Id. Rep. Fawell estimates that the employers affected by the bill "could save as much
as 30 percent in overhead costs and that up to one-half of the 40 million uninsured would find
accessible and affordable health care in the private market ... without new taxes or costly
mandates." Id.
92. CONG. REc. supra note 83, at E830.
93. The amount by which health care costs would rise as a result of such reforms is a
source of debate. One study released by the Health Benefits Coalition, a pro-managed care
group, predicted that the PARCA could add costs to U.S. health care delivery of nearly $1
billion per year. See Study Calls PARCA the Billion-Dollar Bill, MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.;
MANAGED CARE, Mar. 24, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6MLRMC13. Similarly, a study
commissioned by the American Association of Health Plans concluded that the passage of the
PARCA or a similar bill would result in a 10 percent increase in health costs in the U.S. See
Mary Sit-DuVall, Adding Up the Bills, HOUSTON CHRON., June 16, 1998, at 1 (Business
section), available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. The Kaiser Family Foundation,
however, released a study conducted by the accounting firm Coopers & Lybrand which predicts
only a modest increase in health costs due to bills like the PARCA or the Patients' Bill of
Washington University Open Scholarship
182 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 55:161
expand beneficiaries' rights to a variety of health care services and
procedural protections. These rights may come at a cost to enrollees,
however, in the form of higher premiums passed on by employers
and managed care organizations.
94
With the exception of Rep. Fawell's bill, each of the
comprehensive proposals would impose specific provider availability
requirements on managed care organizations. 95 These provisions
restrict the freedom of managed care organizations to contract with
the kinds and numbers of providers they choose. This kind of
provision could make the plans more expensive for managed care
companies to administer if it resulted in the organizations hiring more
physicians or paying more claims on behalf of patients. For patients,
this would allow improved access to physicians, and could increase
their consumption of physicians' services.
Additionally, the provisions in many of these plans, which give
consumers certain rights to specialty care, have the potential to affect
both the health plan payors and beneficiaries.96 Insofar as these
Rights. See Consumer Health Mandates May Raise Premiums a Little or a Lot-Depending,
MED. UTILIZATION MGMT, May 14, 1998, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, AlInws File.
94. While the Kaiser Family Foundation study estimates that the PARCA could result in
an increase in premiums of $40 per year for the typical family HMO policy, see Sit-DuVall,
supra note 93, at 1, the AAHP study predicted possible increases in premiums of 2.2 to 8.6
percent, see Consumer Health Mandates, supra note 93, a significant amount, considering the
fact that a typical family HMO policy costs $5160 per year. See Sit-DuVall, supra note 93, at 1.
The AAHP has criticized the Kaiser study for its exclusion of the costs of expanded tort liability
for managed care organizations under the PARCA from its study. See Consumer Health
Mandates, supra note 93.
95. See PARCA, H.R. 1415, at § 2771(a)(1): "[A] health insurer shall establish and
maintain adequate arrangements, as defined by the applicable State authority, with a sufficient
number, mix, and distribution of health professionals and providers to assure that covered items
and services are available and accessible to each enrollee under health insurance coverage."
Rep. Stark's bill contains a similar provision governing access to health care. See H.R. 1749, at
§ 100 (A). The Patients' Bill of Rights measures, in addition to their requirement of POS
options, further contain provisions mandating that patients be allowed to choose any
participating providers under their plans. See H.R. 3605, § 103; S. 1890, § 103. Rep. Nadler's
Comprehensive Managed Health Care Reform Act also describes its provider availability and
access requirements in language almost identical to that of the PARCA. See H.R. 2905, at §
4(a). See also H.R. 1222, at § 713(a); S. 353, at § 713, subpart 1; H.R. 3009, at §§ 2770, 102;
H.R. 2606, at §§ 2773, 2774.
96. See H.R. 1415, supra note 71, at § 2(c) ("A health insurance offering network
coverage shall demonstrate that enrollees have access to specialized treatment when such
treatment is medically or clinically indicated in the professional judgment of the treating health
professional . .. ."); H.R. 3605, § 104; S. 1890 § 104 ("If the individual has a condition or
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access-to-specialists requirements would increase the use of
specialists by enrollees, costs would rise for managed care
organizations and the employers who purchase the group policies. It
is unclear, though, whether these provisions actually would result in
increased treatment by specialists on a broad scale.
97
Furthermore, provisions in the bills that prohibit financial
incentive plans designed to encourage doctors to limit care could
increase the costs of the plans if patients consume more care, or more
expensive care, as a result.98 No one can predict for certain, though,
the effects of removing these incentives on the amount of care
patients receive.9
9
The impact of the proposals' mandatory procedural safeguards
would depend on the ease with which enrollees could avail
themselves of these provisions and the extent to which patients
understand their rights under them. Most of the proposals would
establish procedural guidelines under which all managed care
organizations would structure their complaint and appeals
disease of sufficient seriousness and complexity to require treatment by a specialist,... the plan
or issuer shall make or provide for a referral to a specialist .... "; H.R. 2905, at § 4(b)(1); H.R-
1222, at § 713(a)(1)(BX4) (imbuing patients with the right to "[t]he availability of specialty
medical services, including physical therapy, occupational therapy, and rehabilitation
services"); S. 353, at § 713, subpart 1, § 2772; H.R. 2606, at § (c) (2776).
97. The HealthLink HMO agreement noted that "[uinfortunately," its primary care
incentive program for "effective management of utilization" did not result in decreased use of
specialists by patients. See supra note 35. Thus, if primary care physicians refer patients to
specialists as often as is needed, and no more, this specialist access provision would be unlikely
to change rates of specialist care consumption. But see Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 625 (8th
Cir. 1997) ("Despite all the warning signs [of a heart attack], Mr. Shea's doctor said a referral
to a cardiologist was unnecessary. .... Unknown to Mr. Shea, [the health plan's] contracts with
its [] doctors created financial incentives that were designed to minimize referrals.").
98. See, e g., H.R. 1415, at § 2(d)(1)(A) ("No specific payment [may be] made directly or
indirectly under the plan to a professional or provider or group of professionals or providers as
an inducement to reduce or limit medically necessary services provided with respect to a
specific enrollee."). See also H.R. 2606, at § c(2781) (imposing a strict prohibition on all such
incentives to limit care). Rep. Roukema's bill would require only that a health plan inform
beneficiaries of the financial arrangements between the plan and the participating providers. See
CONG. REC., supra note 83, at E564.
99. One study detected no difference in treatment received by colorectal cancer patients in
traditional fee-for-service plans, which give providers a natural incentive to provide more care,
and HMOs, many of which use financial incentives to discourage their providers from
"overtreating" patients. See KAREN DAVIS ET AL., HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT 213-16
(1990), cited in Jack K. Kilcullen, supra note 2, at 28 n. 192.
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processes. t00 In order to ensure that patients know their rights to
appeal denials and limitations of coverage under their plans, Rep.
Roukema's bill would mandate that plans notify enrollees in writing
of their right to file grievances. l t The PARCA would direct plan
administrators to review complaints and appeals within a certain
amount of time after the enrollees file their grievances. 10 2 Such
protections would help consumers take advantage of their right to
appeal denials of treatment; however, this could come at the cost of
extra administrative expense. If plans overturned many of their earlier
coverage limitations on appeal, this would raise costs well above that
added by the administrative expense of the more rigorous review
procedures.
Although these and similar measures interfere with the autonomy
of managed care organizations to decide how much and what kind of
health care to provide, the PARCA's and Patients' Bill of Rights'
provisions eliminating ERISA preemption for state law causes of
action against managed care organizations has generated the most
vocal opposition among managed care organizations and
employers. 0 3 Lobbying groups representing these interests have
warned that, if enacted, bills like the PARCA and the Patients' Bill of
Rights could pave the way for a flood of litigation while not
improving health care for plan beneficiaries. 0 4 Additionally, these
groups contend that removing ERISA preemption of malpractice suits
would raise the costs of providing health insurance, thus putting
health care out of the reach of many employees.105 Finally, these
100. See H.R. 1415, at § 2 (2775); CONG. REC., supra note 83, at E564; H.R. 3605, at §§
131-133; S. 1890, at §§ 131-133; H.R. 2905, at § 9; S. 353, at § 713 (2784-2785); H.R 3009, at
§ 5 (501) & (2781); H.R. 2606, at § 3 (2783).
101. SeeCONG. REC., atE564.
102. See H.R. 1415, at § c(2776)(b).
103. Gwen Moulton, Insurance Regulation: Managed Care Reform Debate Hinges on
Republican Leaders, Rank-and-File Support, Jan. 19, 1998, available in LEXIS, Health
Library, BNAHCP File. See also, William B. Schwartz, Make HMOs Accountable Too, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 15, 1998, at A21.
104. "Lawyers like this bill because without ERISA's preemption of state laws, they would
be free to sue employers for medical malpractice.... This bill does nothing for patients and
everything for lawyers," asserted a representative for the National Association of
Manufacturers. See Managed Care Regulation: NAM Study Blasts PARCA, HEALTH LINE, Dec.
18, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, APN File.
105. In an interview with the author, a staff member of the House Subcommittee on
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industry groups maintain that such reform measures represents
unnecessary government interference in health care and that the
market will correct for any deficiencies in the system if left alone. 106
Employee and Employer Relations noted that managed care plans and employers alike have
voiced their disapproval of the PARCA. According to this staff member, employers fear
lawsuits from employee-beneficiaries in the absence of ERISA preemption. Employers contend
that the risk of employee suits against health insurers and against the employers who purchase
the benefit plans would raise employers' costs and would result in employers offering cheaper,
less generous benefit plans, or even no health benefits at all. These PARCA opponents assert
that the bill thus would lead to restricted access to health care for employees. Telephone
interview with Marjorie Watson, Assistant to the Subcommittee on Employer and Employee
Relations (Feb. 20, 1998). See also Moulton, supra note 103(discussing the liability risk for
employers who administer their employees' benefits programs). It was for these reasons that
Governor Lawton Chiles vetoed a measure passed in 1996 by the Florida legislature that would
have created a cause of action for health plan malpractice. Gov. Chiles noted the concerns of
the health insurance industry as well as those of employers: "[H]ealth costs could soar if plans
became embroiled in litigation .... [S]uch legislation would destroy the benefits of managed
care by gutting the concept of cost control." See HMO Liability: Battle at State Level Heats Up,
HEALTH LINE, Jan. 12, 1998, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, APN File.
106. The president and CEO of the American Association of Health Plans questioned
-whether (PARCA) represents the appropriate role of government in health care." See PARCA:
Debates Begin on Norwood's Bill Today, HEALTH LINE, Oct. 23, 1997, available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, APN File. The vice president for government affairs at the same organization
insisted that many of the provisions in PARCA and other congressional bills simply duplicate
policy changes already under way in state legislatures and in the managed care industry to
address consumers' complaints. See New Bill Opens Malpractice Door to Health Plans,
MEDICAL INDUSTRY TODAY, Apr. 24, 1997, available in LEXIS, Genmed Library. See also
Robert Novak, A Health Care Bill That's DOA, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1998, at A22 ("[The
PARCA] fits [President Clinton's] covert plans for big government."). Additionally, to warn
against the dangers of some of the proposed legislation, the Health Benefits Coalition, a group
that includes the National Federation of Independent Business, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Association of Health Plans, and the
Health Insurance Association of America, placed an ad in a Capitol Hill newspaper declaring
that the congressional bills "would mandate a monstrous bureaucracy." See David S.
Hilzenrath, Art Imitates Life when it Comes to Frustration with HMOs, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
1998. at Cl. The CEO and chairman of the insurance company, Aetna, Inc., also wrote that
"[a]lthough politicians seem not to notice, [quality assurance measures are] occurring without a
federal mandate, a presidential task-force, or a new set of regulations from Congress. Yet
somehow the belief persists in Washington that yet another dose of federal 'quality control' will
make patients healthier." Richard L. Huber, Let the Market Remedy What Ails Health Care,
WALL ST. J., July 13, 1998, at A 14.
Patients' rights groups and members of Congress have pressured the health insurance
industry to address health care consumer protection issues. See Moulton supra note 85. Among
those advising the managed care industry to improve its consumer protection standards was
Rep. Kasich, who had written to the AAHP in December, 1997 to wam the managed care
industry that the pressing needs of health care consumers and the abuses under the current
system would force Congress to enact regulations to reign in managed care organizations absent
voluntary reforms on the part of the industry. See Moulton, supra note 103. In response to
consumers' and policy maker's concerns, the American Association of Health Plans (AAHP)
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Advocates for health care consumers counter that the right to sue
plans for medical malpractice would provide an essential remedy to
patients, which they now lack.10 7 Furthermore, the bills' sponsors
dispute the contentions that the bill would raise health care costs and
make insurance unaffordable for those currently covered." 8 Finally,
in response to criticism that proposals such as the PARCA mean
federal intrusion into the health care market, Rep. Norwood describes
the current ERISA preemption provision as government-mandated
protection of the managed care industry.1
0 9
Rep. Stark's Managed Care Plan Accountability Act would have
less drastic effects on managed care organization liability than would
the PARCA. While Rep. Stark's bill would allow plaintiffs to recover
developed Putting Patients First, a patient protection initiative that all of its more than one
thousand member managed care organizations must adopt. See Health Plans Vote to Require
Patient-Centered Policies for Membership in AAHP (1997) <http://www.aahp.org>. Managed
care industry executives have argued that their organizations hardly need this nudging from
government leaders, let alone the blunt force of federal regulations. Bill Gradison, president of
the Health Insurance Association of America, explained why extensive government regulation
is unnecessary for improving the delivery of health care: "[F]rankly, today in health care the
consumers are king." The News Hour with Jim Lehrer: A Bill of Health (PBS television
broadcast, Feb. 5, 1998).
107. The executive director of the Center for Patient Advocacy insisted that "unless
patients have the right to sue, managed care companies will be free to deny services without
fear of being held accountable." See PARCA: Debate Begins on Norvood's Bill, supra note 72.
Rep. Norwood summed up the reason for the proposed bill: "[W]e're saying to the managed
care companies, 'If you make decisions about utilization of care, the patient and provider
should have some appeal to a higher authority other than your accountants."' See Ronald M.
Schwartz, PARCA bill would rein in managed care, AM. DRUGGIST, July, 1997, at 31, available
in LEXIS, Genmed Library, Alljnl File. According to a study by Harvard University and the
Kaiser Family Foundation, more than three out of five people surveyed said beneficiaries
should have the right to sue their health care plans for malpractice. See Hilzenrath, supra note
106, at CI.
108. Rep. Norwood denied that his proposal would drive up costs for managed care
organizations currently providing sufficient and fair benefits. He acknowledged, however, that
for health plans that "do everything they can to add to the profit [rather] than to the care of the
patient, there will be some cost." See Schwartz, supra note 78, at 31. While the opponents of
PARCA emphasize the bill's potential to raise costs for the employer and beneficiaries, Rep.
Norwood focused on the possible cuts in managed care organizations profits. He admonished,
"[R]emember, these managed care companies take 30 cents out of the health care dollar. What
we say is, "'You may not be able to have but 29 cents after this bill passes."' See id.
109. Charlie Norwood, Protection for Patients, WASH. PoST, Feb. 18, 1998, at A21. Rep.
Norwood pointed out that "[h]ealth insurance is the only industry in this country that enjoys a
federally mandated shield against liability for its actions .... Id. He firther noted the irony
that "those who oppose reform because of their dislike of government involvement don't have a
bit of a problem supporting this kind of deadly involvement in the health care market." Id.
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compensatory and punitive damages for a plan's improper denial of
benefits, the bill includes this right as part of ERISA rather than
allowing a state law cause of action.110 Thus, this bill introduces the
risk that a managed care organization would have to pay punitive
damages to a wronged beneficiary, yet does not expose the
organizations to litigation under varying state laws.
By contrast, Rep. Fawell's bill proposes to add small business
insurance purchasing groups to those health insurers sheltered from
state and federal tort liability under ERISA's preemption provision.'
I n
While this bill would make insurance more affordable for small
businesses and their employees, it would do this in part by shielding
managed care organizations and employers from liability for medical
cost containment policies and from state coverage mandates. 1 12 Thus,
while more consumers would have access to health care, this bill
would limit the patient protections available to them to the terms of
the plan." 3
III. PROPOSAL: THE MODEL HEALTH CARE ACCOUNTABILITY AND
INFORMATION ACT
For American health care consumers to receive affordable, high-
quality health care, they must have the ability to bargain on a more
equal level with both the insurers and the providers of their care.
While providers have long labored under the threat of malpractice
suits for their medical errors, health care insurers have yet to contend
with the consequences of their own medical decisions. The Model
Act thus would remove the ERISA preemption of state tort law as
applied to health care plans." 4 Eliminating the ERISA tort liability
shield might drive up health insurance costs as insurers paid to
defend lawsuits and practiced more "defensive" medicine. 1 5 In part,
110. See supra note 76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Managed Care Plan
Accountability Act.
IlI. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text for discussion of Rep. Fawell's bill.
112. See CONG. REC., supra note 83, at E830.
113. Id
114. This echoes identical provisions in H.R. 1415, at § 4; H.R. 3605, at 302; S. 1890, at
302; H.R. 2606, at § 4; and in H.R. 3009, at § 204.
115. "'Defensive" medicine refers to the practice of physicians, out of fear of lawsuits,
providing excessive care, which furnishes little added benefit to the patients. For a discussion of
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though, this "defensive" medicine would correct for some of the
unrealistic and harmful cost-cutting practices of the managed care
organizations." 6 To prevent large jury awards from bankrupting
health plans, the plan directors would have to carry malpractice
insurance, which currently is carried by hospitals and physicians.' 17
Although exposing managed care organizations to tort liability might
raise costs, no other health care decision-maker in America enjoys
this far-reaching immunity from tort actions; removing this special
protection recognizes the principle that those who cause harm in the
course of their business should be held accountable to those
harmed."'
Plan beneficiaries need adequate information as well as the right
to sue their health plans. The market for health care can function
properly only if consumers know exactly what their plans cover and
do not cover." 9 The Model Act would impose uniform reporting
measures on all U.S. health care plans, which would require plans to
inform beneficiaries fully of the plans' policies. Failure to do so
would be actionable under any applicable state contract laws.
the costs of defensive medicine and malpractice suits, see Kenneth Pedroza, Note: Cutting Fat
or Cutting Corners, Health Care Delivery and Its Respondent Effect on Liability, 38 ARIZ. L.
Rnv. 399,399,402 (1996).
116. Had United feared a lawsuit in Corcoran, the company administrators probably would
have heeded, or at least considered more carefully, the advice of Mrs. Corcoran's obstetrician.
One author summarized the health plan lawsuit immunity trade-off thusly: "Concealing the true
price [of health plans' improper care decisions] to patients by barring lawsuits may keep
premiums low, but it simply shifts the burden to the patients and eliminates a highly desirable
signal that can deter improper refusals of HMOs to pay for care." Schwartz, supra note 103, at
A21.
117. The executive director of the AAHP expressed concern that "members of Congress
think a vote against managed care is a free vote with no consequences. But the larger
consequence is to take us back to fee-for-service medicine" with resultant soaring health care
costs. See Laurie McGinley, All Sides get Ready for Push to Regulate HMOs, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 17, 1997, at A28.
118. See Jack K. Kilcullen, supra note 2, at 10 (discussing the theory behind enterprise
liability that "the party benefited by the behavior" should bear the cost of the conduct "which
put the victim at risk"). A health care consultant insisted that managed care companies "can't
have it both ways. They can't ... save money through effective utilization review, and then,
when something goes wrong, say 'It has nothing to do with us."' See Laurie McGinley, Broad
Battle to End HMOs' Limited Liabilityfor Treatment-Coverage Denials Gains Steam, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 12, 1998, at A22.
119. Rep. Fawell has voiced his support for disclosure measures and due process
proceedings for enrollees' grievances. See Insurance Regulation, HEALTH CARE POLICY
REPORT, Feb. 2, 1998, available in LEXIS, Health Library, BNA File, at 211.
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Additionally, the Act would require plans to notify beneficiaries of
the plans' appeals processes and their rights thereunder as well.
120
The Model Act distinguishes itself from the congressional
proposals currently under consideration in that it would not mandate
that health care plans provide any particular substantive benefits.
With ERISA preemption of state health insurance laws removed,
however, the states would enjoy free reign to enact any reforms they
deem necessary to protect their health care consumers or their
managed care businesses.12 1 States also would be free to impose
damages caps on jury awards for health plan malpractice. In this way,
the different entities in the health care market (consumers, providers,
insurers, and employers) could negotiate openly for compromises
with one another and could compete for state legislation, which
benefits their respective interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the last two decades, health care has changed from a fee-for-
service based system, with its spiraling costs, to a managed care-
dominated industry with its success in cost containment. This
industry-wide shift has resulted in a lowered rate of growth for health
care costs; however, this change has not come without costs of its
own. The drive to lower costs has caused managed care organizations
to sacrifice the quality of the care they provide by denying treatments
deemed too costly and by bypassing the recommendations of the
physicians with whom they contract. ERISA's preemption of state
tort law claims has left injured consumers without an effective
remedy for what amounts to medical malpractice. A Health Care
Accountability and Information Act would remove this liability
shield, allowing consumers to seek redress for wrongs committed
against them and giving a powerful disincentive to insurers to skimp
120. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text for discussion of notification
provisions in current congressional proposals.
121. One HMO industry representative noted that a federal scheme of rights could benefit
insurers who are "getting nickeled and dimed to death by the Disease of the Month Club," a
reference to the many different anti-managed care state bills currently under consideration. See
McGinley, Push to Regulate HMOs, supra note 117, at A28 (statement of David Abernathy,
senior vice president of Health Insurance Plans, a New York HMO).
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on the quality of the care they deliver. The Act's information
requirement would ensure that consumers know their rights under
their plans and are well-equipped to assert their rights. This Act,
though, balances the rights of insurers with those of consumers by not
imposing legislatively required benefits on health plans, leaving the
market to determine the benefits that consumers find cost-justified.122
Amy Shaner Korte*
122. For a discussion of the need for consumer information to allow the market for health
care to function efficiently, see J. Patrick Green, Speculations on Managed Care, 31
CREIGHTON L. REv. 679, 687 (1998).
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